# CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

# INFORMATION REPORT

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SUBJECT  1. Communist Control of the Press 2. General Comments on the Political and Economic Situation  DATE DISTR.  17 May 1954  NO. OF PAGES  12  DATE OF INFO.  PLACE ACQUIRED  PLACE ACQUIRED  25X1  REFERENCES  FOR CRITICAL SECURITY REASE THIS REPORT ARE DEFINITIVE.  STATES, OF RETURN THE BURITS STATES, WITHOUT THE SOURCE.	DATE OF INFO.  2. General Comments on the Political and Economic Situation  DATE OF INFO.  PLACE ACQUIRED  25X1  Communist Control of the Press DATE DISTR.  17 May 1954  NO. OF PAGES  12  REQUIREMENT NO.  25X1  FOR CRITICAL SECURITY REASONS THIS RETCRI IS NOT TO BE FURTHER TRANSMITTED WITHIN THE UNITED  STATES, OR EXTURE THE BORDESS  THE SOURCE EVALUATIONS IN THIS REPORT ARE DEFINITIVE.  OF THE UNITED STATES, WITHOUT THE		SECRET		
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#### Control of the Press in Yugoslavia

- 1. During the reorganization in the Yugoslav Communist Party in 1953, Agitprop was renamed Commission for Culture and Education (Komisija za Kulturu i Prosvjetu). It was one of the most important commissions of the Central Committee of the Union of Communists of Yugoslavia (SKJ - Savez Komunista Jugoslavije) because it controlled all media of information and propaganda, educational institutions, and arts. The Commission of Culture and Education in Belgrade controlled the press and propaganda and all cultural activities in all six People's Republics of Federated Yugoslavia - Serbia, Croatia, Slovenia, Bosnia-Herzegovina, and Montenegro - through identical Commissions for Culture and Education in each one of the republics.
- The fundamental political line to be followed by the Commission for Culture and Education was formulated in the supreme body of the Party, the Secretariat General (formerly Politburo) of the Central Committee of the Party. The decisions of the Secretariat General were transmitted through the "Responsible" for Culture and Education in the Central Committee to the Chief of the Commission for Culture and Education for implementation. Both the "Responsible" and the Chief of the Commission for Culture and Education accounted to the Central Committee for their activities.
- 3. The Commission for Culture and Education was divided into:
  - a. Press Section (Stampa)

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- c. Educational Section (Skole obrazovanje)
- d. Arts Section (Umjetnost)
- 4. Each section with its further subdivisions was headed by a chief, who had to be a member of the Party. In this manner a perfect control was exercised down to the smallest unit. Chiefs and subchiefs were doubly controlled, on the one hand as officials in the Commission and on the other as members of the Communist Party.
- 5. Boris Kraigher was chief of the Commission for Culture and Education in Slovenia. He was at the same time Minister of the Interior of the People's Republic of Slovenia, chief of the Office for State Security "UDV" (Uprava Drzavne Varnosit, which is the Slovene name for UDB Uprava Drzavne Bezbednosti). He is a member of the Central Committee in Belgrade and chairman of the Executive Committee of the People's Assembly (Narodna Skupstina). As chief of the Office for State Security, Kraigher was the watchdog of Rankovic, the former federal Minister of the Interior and chief of the Federal Office for State Security (UDB).
- 6. Rudi Janhuba was in charge of the Press Section and Vlada Vodopivec was in charge of the Educational Section. Bogo Pregelj, professor of Slavic studies at the University of Ljubljana, was also a member of the Commission for Gulture and Education.

# Organization of the Yugoslav Political Press


- 7. The press was under the strict and complete control of the Communist Party of Yugoslavia. The press may be divided into four categories:
  - a. Publications of the Union of Communists of Yugoslavia (SKJ Savez Komunista Jugoslavije);
  - b. Publications of the "People's Front", that is of the Socialist Union of Working People (SSRN - Socijalisticki Savez Radnoga Narodna) and of the People's Youth of Yugoslavia (NOJ - Narodna Omladina Jugoslavije);
  - c. Publications of Cooperative and Trade Organizations (Organi Zadruznih i Strucnih Organizacija);
  - d. Publications of the Government and Administration (Organi Drzavne Uprave i Administracije).
- 8. Each of these organizations had its own publishing companies to which editorial offices of newspapers and other publications were subordinated. The work of the publishing companies was coordinated and controlled by the Commission for Culture and Education.
- 9. In Slovenia the Commission for Culture and Education (Komisija za Kulturu i Znanost) was attached to the Secretariat of the Socialist Union of Working People (SZDL Socijalisticna Zveza Delavnego Ljudstva the Slovene name for SSRN), a Communist Party organization. Leading positions in SZDL were held by members of the Central Committee of the Party. Only Party members could hold even the least responsible positions. The Chairman of the Commission for Culture and Education was always a member of the Central Committee of the Party and responsible to it for his work. His work was

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supervised by the "Responsible" for Culture and Education in the Secretariat (formerly Politburo), of the Central Committee of the Party. The Secretariat and the Central Committee of the People's Republic of Slovenia were responsible for their work to the Federal Secretariat and Central Committee in Belgrade. In the Central Committee in Belgrade the political Party line and tactics were formulated for the entire country.

- 10. Directors of publishing companies were as a rule members of the Committee for Culture and Education. Editors in chief of newspapers and periodicals were members of the managing boards of publishing companies. Editors in chief of local publications were responsible for their work to the managing boards of publishing companies and, as they were all Party members, to the basic organ or cell of the Party and to the Party leaders.
- 11. The organization of the Federal and Republic Political Press was as follows:



- 12. It can be seen from this chart that the responsibility was direct. The Commission for Culture and Education exercised complete control and censorship of the press. There was no need for state censorship since every chief editor and editor was responsible for his work both to the Publishing Company Board and as Party member to the Party leadership.
- 13. Ordinary mistakes committed by editors resulted in their demotion or dismissal. Mistakes of a more serious nature such as deviation from the political line, or failure to carry out the directives of the Central Committee, resulted in expulsion from the Party, which was usually followed by arrest.

### Editorial Offices and the Staff of Journalists

14. The editor in chief was responsible for the organization and running of an editorial office as well as for following the Party political line and the purity of ideological contents. There was frequent replacement of editors in chief because a man was very seldom capable of satsifying the requirements of the Secretariat. The editor in chief, together with the chiefs of various sections of a newspaper, formed the Editorial Board. The editor in chief was responsible for all aspects of work of newspaper section chiefs. A newspaper section chief organized the work of the journalists and reporters in his section and controlled and supervised the following of political line in each section.

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- 15. The journalistic personnel was divided into four classes:
  - a. Journalists of the First Class included: Directors of publishing companies, editors in chief of federal newspapers and publications, some newspaper section editors of federal newspapers, chief editors of the largest newspapers in People's Republics, and a few politically reliable and professionally highly qualified journalists;
  - b. Journalists of the Second Class included: Section chiefs of federal newspapers, editors in chief of newspapers of People's Republics, and politically reliable and professionally highly qualified journalists and editors;
  - c. Journalists of the Third Class included: Section chiefs of newspapers in People's Republics, editors in chief of provincial and local newspapers, qualified journalists, editors and reporters;
  - d. Journalists of the Fourth Class included: Cub reporters and other beginners in journalism.
- 16. All other personnel connected with a newspaper was likewise classified into several classes according to their work and qualifications.
- 17. The leading force in editorial offices consisted of politically reliable journalists, old and tried members of the Party. Party discipline and ability to adhere strictly to the political line takes precedence over professional qualifications.
- 18. The journalistic cadre of Yugoslavia consisted of a small number of old journalists who completely surrendered themselves to Communism, a large number of young post-war journalists, convinced Communists, who were mostly graduates of some Party school, and many persons who were assigned to newspapers because of their Party political work as activists. Most of the last group had no idea of journalism.
- 19. The backbone of editorial offices and of the entire organization of a newspaper consisted of young and old professionally highly qualified journalists who had to be watched politically. They worked under the constant control and guidance of the Communists.
- 20. In the course of 1953 an intense campaign was undertaken to fill all newspaper jobs with Party members. In the process of reorganization highly qualified journalists who were not members of the Party were dismissed and their places taken by less qualified but politically reliable Party members. The criterion for retention was membership in the Party.

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23.	Because of the numerous items from the West the circulation of increased by leaps and bounds so that by September 1953 the "P	
25X1	printed in 100,000 copies.	
25X1		
24.	As the diplomatic relations between Yugoslavia and the Soviet became normalized in the course of 1953 the Communist Party at	Bloc countries titude toward
25X1	the U.S. and the West began to change.	
25X1		
25.		
25X1	the decision was made to tr printing of "PP" from the "Polet" publishing company to the pu	ansfer the
25X1	pany of the SZDL of Slovenia of which Janhuba was the chief.	
25X1	meanwhile Dr. Dusan Savnik was appointed to the editorial staf	In the
25X1	as an observer In September 1953,	
25X1	Savnik was named chief editor of the paper which was renamed "	TT".
26.		
25X1		
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27.		
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28.	The political line of a newspaper was discussed and agreed upo	n at irregular
25X1	meetings of the managing board. In case of disagreement on so	me point
25X1	the final decision was left for the Se	
23/1	SZDL which was also empowered to appoint and dismiss editors.	
25X1		
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29.	Journalists did not have a chance to deviate from the Party litheir work was watched both by their superiors and by the Party	
	tion .;	y Organiza-
25X1		
25X1	However, when diplomatic	
25X1 '	the Communist bloc were re-established, the attitude of the Particle West assumed a less friendly aspect.	rty toward the
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4 Y	The Impact of the Controlled Press on Popular Attitudes
30.	The Party-controlled press has no impact on public opinion in general. The majority of people are anti-Communist and tired of the monotony of the Communist press. Members of the Party naturally would follow the Party
25X1	line.
25X1	The case of the Anglo-American decision on Trieste represents a special problem. Yugoslav people, especially those in and near the regions of Trieste, believed that they had a rightful claim to Trieste. The
	Communist-controlled press did not need to turn opinion. On the contrary, it was a welcome chance for the population not only to show its traditional
	attitude but to give vent to its feelings and pent up emotions under Communist control. By vociferously protesting against the Anglo-American
?	decision they at the same time protested indirectly against the Communist regime. The Western world should not take such demonstrations seriously.
31.	It is probable that the regime has succeeded somewhat in dulling the public's ability to separate facts from propaganda but that "success" is limited to matters not of primary concern to the population. In Slovenia, where practically every houshold of its one and one-half million population has some relative in the U.S., the people are well aware of the situation in the
	West, and no amount of propaganda can change their attitude and knowledge.  However, among the young people who matured under the Communist regime and who are Party members, the regime has had some success.
	Popular Attitudes Toward the Tito Regime and Its Policies
32.	
	mean that they would not fight against the Soviet Union or any of the Satellites in case of war. The Yugoslav army is well organized and homogeneous. Its core consists of about 400,000 partisans who experienced the trials of enemy
25X1	occupation and who fought against the enemy. The regular army is well under control of the regime and devoted to Tito.
25X1 ···	People hate the local Communists and Communist hierarchy but they approve of Tito's foreign policy, which has brought with it some relaxation in the economic and agrarian policies. Life is hard in Yugoslavia. Wages are small while the prices are high. It is a paradox that in a proletarian country the workers should be the ones who suffer most.
33•	The average Slovene worker is dissatisfied with the difficult living conditions and exploitation by the regime. He is against the domestic policy but approves of Tito's foreign policy especially since the rapprochement with the U.S. People say "Tito is the smartest politician." Workers are tired of the meetings, propaganda, and other impositions of the local Communist Party. Often
25X1	they do not hesitate openly to criticize the hard conditions under which they have to live.
34.	the regime is succeeding in its efforts to win the alle-
	giance of the Yugoslav youth and to turn them against Catholicism. Youth is the most favored group in Yugoslavia.
	One concrete achievement of the regime is the fact that it has definitely succeeded in lessening the mutual animosities
25X1	between ethnic groups in Yugoslavia. There is no doubt
25X1	that any Yugoslav would defend any part of Yugoslavia against a common enemy regardless of his religion or ethnic origin.
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### The Economic Situation

36. Living conditions in Slovenia are difficult. A worker's wage ranges from 6,000 to 12,000 dinars per month. A peasant may have an income from 2,000 to 15,000 dinars per month. With that income the worker has to face the high prices, especially of manufactured goods: a woolen suit costs 20,000 to 30,000 dinars; a shirt 1,000 to 3,000 dinars; a pair of shoes 3,000 to 4,000 dinars; rubber boots 2,000 to 3,000 dinars; living quarters 600 to 2,000 dinars per month; bread 36 dinars per kilogram; butter from 200 to 250 dinars per kilogram; meat from 200 to 400 dinars per kilogram; potatoes 25 dinars per kilogram. The standard of living is low. Staple foods are bread and potatoes. Meat is eaten once or twice a week. Milk costs 25 dinars per liter; wine from 100 to 200 dinars per liter; nylon stockings 1,200 dinars per pair; men's socks from 300 to 400 dinars per pair.

25X1 1,200 dinars per pair; men's

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38. The Yugoslav Communist regime is primarily concerned with the socialization of the country and carrying out Marxist principles regardless of the expense but with promises for a better future. The relaxing of controls are only tactical maneuvers in the Party's activities. The basic attitude of the ruling clique has neither changed nor modified its long-term goals. Yugoslavia is a Communist state led by well-disciplined and real Communists. Tito was such a leftist that even Stalin was annoyed with him. Its internal political situation determined Yugoslav foreign policy action in accordance with orthodox Marxist principles. Foreign policy follows the principle of expediency.

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# The Party

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- 39. The morale in the Party hierarchy and among the Party rank and file is good. For a while after the break with the Cominform the Party was in confusion. The members did not know where to turn. But with Tito's change of policy and rapprochement with the West the Party began to get together although it still remained without a definite compass. Since the re-establishment of relations with Communist bloc countries the Party seems to have acquired a new vigor, to have found its compass. Yugoslav football teams visiting Hungary, Rumania, and other Satellite countries received warm receptions. Toward the fall of 1953, as the relations with Satellite countries became normalized, the attitude of the regime began to change toward the West. With the fall of Djilas, who was marked as too pro-Western, a tightening of control of press and propaganda has begun. A growing anti-Western ettitude was noticeable in Party ranks.
- 40. Party members expected changes with the demise of Stalin. It is a known fact in Yugoslavia that Tito was Malenkov's protege. It was through Malenkov's recommendation that Tito was named Secretary of the Communist Party of Yugoslavia in 1937. Tito's stock was very high in the Communist world before the breach with the Cominform in 1948.
- 41. Tito's name was mentioned right after Stalin's. When Vladimir Dedijer was in Moscow in 1946 it is said Stalin stated: "I shall go one of these days, but Tito must be here for Europe." The USSR is the motherland of Communism, and Yugoslavia as a Communist country must ultimately align itself with other Communist countries.

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42.	Membership in the Party brings with it privileges and a favorable status. Many young people consider it an honor to become members of the Party, especially if they come from poor peasant and workers origin. The people in general, however, hate, distrust, and fear the Party. The credit for relaxation of controls was given rather to the influence of the U.S. than to the Party. The people feel they can never known when the Party might tighten the string. Party tactics are comparable to "slalom", a wavy line with dips and rises according to expedience, but the Party does not digress from its main aim. The Party has not lost its spirit as a cohesive group. This is especially exemplified in the new vigor of the Party in 1953. The Party is more popular among the masses of the so-called passive regions of old Yugoslavia - Macedonia, Bosnia, Montenegro.
	Yugoslav Relations with the Cominform
43.	The resumption of full diplomatic relations with the Soviet bloc marks the turning point in the Party's life.
44.	The attitude toward the West has deteriorated in direct relation to the improvement of relations with the Soviet bloc.
45. 25X1	The public in general is pleased with the Yugoslav foreign policy toward the West. Members of the Party are not. relations with the East are going to develop at the expense of relations with the West.
46.	Members of the Communist Party, whether Cominformists or not, may be regarded as anti-Western. The majority of the population of Yugoslavia, however, are pro-Western. The removal from his official position of Djilas as "too pro-Western" is a good example of the Party attitude toward the West. As long as the Party remains in power in Yugoslavia the country's orientation will be eastward and not westward. Yugoslav Communist Party's attitude toward the West in the last two years may be ascribed to political expediency rather than to sincere friendship. Party policy may be compared to the steering wheel of an automobile. The wheel has a play to the left or right and the Communist Party policy moves within that free play of the wheel in either direction without changing the main course of the automobile.
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47• 25X1	Cominformists were in a minority in Yugoslavia. There is no doubt that Cominformists would do anything to overthrow the regime,
25X1	but it may not be necessary because following the normalization of relations with the Eastern Bloc, a noticeable decline in the criticism of the Cominform was evident. In May 1953, 40 Cominformists and 1,317 "pro-Western" members were excluded from the Communist Party; in June, three Cominformists and 2,011 "pro-Western" members, and in July no Cominformists and 4,712 "pro-Western" members.
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49.	On 22 October 1953 all students who had been expelled from the University for being Cominformists were allowed to register in Universities.
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50 <b>s</b>	Committees were formed to regulate border incidents. Party members openly stated that normalization of relations was carried out according to the Yugoslav-Soviet plan.					
	The Question of Succession					
51.	Rankovic Rankovic is a quiet man: Kardel, is a Party ideologist. The regime's					
25X1	he would turn to the					
25X1 25X1	USSR although he was personally discredited with the Cominform. If possible perhaps both would like to continue Tito's policy. Kardelj has great influence in the Party.					
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55•	Boris Ziherl, Party ideologist for Slovenia, was a Partisan. After the war he was director of the Superior Party School (Visoka Partijska Skola) in Belgrade in which are trained the highest Communists. He is a member of the Secretariat of Slovenia and member of the Central Committee of the Communist Party in Belgrade.
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56.	Zoran Polic, before World War II led the left wing of the sports organization "Sokol" in Slovenia. He joined the Partisans in 1941-1942. He was a member of the first Slovene government as Minister of the Interior, later held the post of Minister of Finance until 1953, when he became Secretary of the Slovene government. He is a Party member
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57•	Engineer Milos Brelih,
25X1	is Director of Electrification, which includes all electrical enter-
	prises in Slovenia. He was Minister of Electrification. As a Partisan he held high positions as Partisan commissar.
25X1	nett fign positions as farotsan commission
25X1 25X1	
58.	Vlado Vodopivec in in 1953 was secretary for Culture and Education in the Slovene government. He was editor of the paper Ljudska Pravica, organ of the Slovene Communist Party,
25X1	also program director of Radio Ljubljana.
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59•	Dr. Dusan Savnik, politically not important,
25X1	He was formerly a journalist
25X1 ·	and since September 1953 he has been editor of the weekly paper "TT"
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